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Abstract: Biometric template protection approaches have been developed to secure the biometric templates against image reconstruction on the stored templates. Two cancellable 
fingerprint template protection approaches namely minutiae-based bit-string cancellable fingerprint template and modified minutiae-based bit-string cancellable fingerprint template, 
are selected to be evaluated. Both approaches include the geometric information of the fingerprint into the extracted minutiae. Six modified fingerprint data sets are derived from 
the original fingerprint images in FVC2002DB1_B and FVC2002DB2_B by conducting the rotation and changing the quality of original fingerprint images according to the 
environment conditions during an emergency situation such as wet or dry fingers and disoriented angle of fingerprint images. The experimental results show that the modified 
minutiae-based bit-string cancellable fingerprint template performs well on all conditions during an emergency situation by achieving the matching accuracy between 83% and 
100% on FVC2002DB1_B data set and between 99% and 100% on FVC2002DB2_B data set.  
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1 INTRODUCTION   
 
Biometric-based authentication system uses unique and 
measurable biological characteristics of an individual to 
verify a person [1]. Biometric-based authentication is more 
convenient than other user authentication techniques based 
on passwords or smartcards. Passwords can be forgotten and 
smartcards must be carried. Biometric-based authentication 
systems are used in many applications such as law 
enforcements, healthcare, banking, access controls and smart 
phones. Fingerprint is a cheap and convenient way to identify 
someone because fingerprint scanners are small and cheap in 
comparison with other biometric capturing devices [1, 2]. 
However, a biometric-based authentication system has a 
serious drawback on privacy. Under a traditional fingerprint-
based authentication system, an unknown original fingerprint 
image can be reconstructed from a stored fingerprint template 
[3, 4]. Therefore, biometric template protection (BTP) 
methods have been used for the security of fingerprint 
templates. Fig. 1 shows the fingerprint-based authentication 
system with the template protection. 
 
 
Figure 1 Fingerprint-based authentication system with a template protection  
  
 The biometric template protection schemes are 
commonly categorized as feature transformation (or 
Cancellable Biometrics (CB)) and biometric cryptosystems 
(BCS) as shown in Fig. 2. In this work, two CB techniques 
are evaluated under an emergency situation for personal 
health record systems. One of the challenges in fingerprint 
template protections is the performance degradation after 
performing a template protection. This issue is amplified 
when the user is unconscious because the quality of the 
fingerprint image might be affected by many environment 
conditions and human errors. During an emergency, the 
emergency service person is the main person to collect the 
fingerprint images from the victim. Thus, the fingerprint 
image quality might be affected by environment such as wet 
or dry fingers and the orientation of the finger during the 
fingerprint collection process.  
 
 
Figure 2 Biometric template protection techniques [3] 
 
In this work, two CB techniques are evaluated with 
various fingerprint quality generated according to the 
environment conditions during an emergency situation such 
as wet or dry fingers and disoriented angle of fingerprint 
images. The result of this work will be further used for 
proposing an improved fingerprint feature transformation 
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approach for personal health record users during an 
emergency situation.  
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides information on biometric 
template protection. The experimental settings are described 
in Section 3. Results and discussions are given in Section 4 
while the conclusion is shown in Section 5.  
 
2 BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION 
 
The fingerprint-based authentication system consists of 
two main processes, including enrolment and authentication 
[2]. For the enrolment process, a fingerprint image is 
captured and features are extracted from the fingerprint 
image. The biometric template protection algorithm is 
performed on the fingerprint templates and stored in the 
system database as the protected templates. Depending on 
whether the biometric system is applied for the identification 
or the verification process, the authentication is performed 
differently. The verification system confirms the person’s 
identity by performing a one-to-one comparison between the 
queried fingerprint and the stored fingerprint template. The 
identification system performs a one-to-many comparison by 
searching the entire system database.  
According to the international standard ISO/IEC 24745: 
biometric information protection, the biometric template 
protection schemes must meet these properties: 
irreversibility, unlinkability, revocability and performance 
[5]. The irreversibility means the reconstruction from the 
protected biometric template to the original image or the 
biometric sample, should be difficult. The unlinkability 
refers to the link between the protected biometric template 
from one application to another application should not be 
possible. The revocability means that the new template can 
be revoked and re-issued like a password in an event of the 
compromising template information. The performance 
property means that the template protection method should 
not degrade the recognition performance across a number of 
applications.  
The feature transformation consists of the distortion or 
the transformation of the biometric features based on the 
transformation function [3]. According to the characteristics 
of the transformation function, this category can be further 
divided into the invertible transform (salting) and the 
noninvertible transform. Salting is one of the template 
protections approaches. The user specific extra information 
is added to the original biometric features using an invertible 
function with a key or a password. The user needs to 
remember the key and presents it during the authentication. 
Therefore, the security of the salting is relied on the 
protection of the key. The template will be compromised 
when the key is stolen. The main advantage of the salting is 
the incorporation of the additional information into the 
biometric template in the form of keys. It makes difficult for 
an imposter to guess the template. The main drawback of the 
salting approach is that the security of this scheme relies upon 
the secrecy of the key. In the noninvertible transform, a one-
way function is applied on the biometric features. Unlike the 
salting approach, the noninvertible function does not rely on 
the secrecy of the keys. The difficulty of reversing the 
transformation function is the major protection of the 
biometric data. The protected template can be revoked and 
issued a new one by changing the transformation parameter 
in the case of compromising. 
 



















































































1 [5] CB (P-MCC)         
2 [6] CB (bit-string)         
3 [8] CB (MCC)         
4 [10] CB (P-MCC)         
5 [13] CB            
6 [14] CB            
7 [15] CB            
8 [16] CB            
9 [17] CB            
10 [20] CB            
11 [11] CB            
12 [18] CB            
13 [23] CB            
14 [7] CB VeriFinger         
15 [12] CB VeriFinger         
16 [19] CB VeriFinger 6.0         
17 [21] CB VeriFinger         
18 [22] CB VeriFinger 6.0         
 
Template protection of this work is a cancellable 
fingerprint template generation approach. The literature 
review of cancellable fingerprint template generation 
approaches is described in Tab. 1. Researchers used different 
types of fingerprint features. Some approaches extracted not 
only minutiae but also singular point and other features [5, 6, 
15, 19]. The resulted template representation was also 
different. Some methods performed the correlation-based 
matching [18]. The protected fingerprint templates were 
generated as a complex vector [6-8, 10, 12, 21-23] or a binary 
bit-string [11, 13, 14, 16]. In the design of cancellable 
fingerprint templates, some researchers focused on the 
template generation from the minutia information [9, 13, 16, 
17, 20] while some researchers spent more effort on the 
design of non-invertible transformations [6-8, 10-11]. The 
protected templates in related works were generated in a 
binary form because of its simplicity in the feature 
representation. The design of non-invertible transformation 
functions in the related methods used a permutation process.  
 
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS 
 
Two cancellable fingerprint templates (CB) namely 
minutiae-based bit-strings CB and modified minutiae-based 
bit-strings CB are evaluated in this work. Fingerprint 
Verification Competitions (FVC) databases were used for 
evaluating both CB approaches. However, the fingerprints 
are modified to mimic the conditions of emergency situations 
described previously.  
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3.1 FVC Databases  
 
 The commonly used fingerprint evaluating databases 
are Fingerprint Verification Competitions (FVC) databases 
such as FVC2000, FVC2002, FVC2004 and FVC2006 [24-
27]. Each FVC database is composed of four sub-databases 
DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4. DB1, DB2 and DB3 were 
collected using optical, capacitive and thermal sensors, 
respectively. DB4 was created using Synthetic Fingerprint 
Generator (SFinGe). Each sub-database includes two subsets 
A and B. For three data sets (DB1, DB2 and DB3), subset A 
contains 100 fingers with 8 impressions (800 images) and 
subset B contains 10 fingers with 8 impressions (80 images). 
Fingers from set B have been available to allow a parameter 
tuning process and the benchmark is then tested by the 
fingers from set A. In FVC2000, the acquisition conditions 
were different for each database [24]. In FVC2002, the 
acquisition conditions were the same for each database [25]. 
Interleaved acquisition of different fingers causes differences 
in the finger placement. FVC2004 and FVC2006 databases 
were collected with the aim of creating a more difficult 
benchmark [26, 27].  
 
3.2 Modified FVC Databases 
 
During the emergency situation, the victim fingerprint 
cannot be placed in the same direction with the enrolled 
(registered) image. The collected fingerprint images can have 
variations such as wet finger, dry finger and the image 
acquisition style. Therefore, the input fingerprint images are 
modified in our work as proposed in [28] to create these three 
conditions. The fingerprint image brightness is changed to 
reduce the brightness by 70% (denoted B (-70) and to 
increase the brightness by 35% (denoted B (+35)). The 
fingerprint image is rotated clockwise by 5 degrees (denoted 
CW5)) and the fingerprint image is rotated clockwise by 10 
degrees (denoted CW10). The fingerprint image is rotated 
counter clockwise by 5 degrees (denoted CCW5) and the 
fingerprint image is rotated counter clockwise by 10 degrees 
(denoted CCW10).  Tab. 2 shows the samples modified 
fingerprint image used in this work. 
 
Table 2 Samples of fingerprint images in modified sub-data sets  
B (−70) B (+35) CW5 CW10 CCW5 CCW10 
      
 
3.3 Minutiae-based Bit-strings CB 
 
Minutiae-based bit-strings CB is proposed in [13] which 
the generation of the fingerprint template was performed by 
mapping the minutiae in the 3D array in order to remove the 
pre-alignment of the fingerprint requirement. The 
transformed fingerprint template is generated by mapping the 
minutiae in the 3D array and stored as bit-strings.  
After scanning the finger and receiving the fingerprint 
image, the minutiae were extracted from the image and used 
as inputs in the template protection method. A 3D array 
which consisted of cells was created and mapped the 
minutiae into the cells based on the position and the 
orientation of the reference minutiae. One of the minutiae 
was chosen as the reference minutia. The position of the 
reference minutia was at the centre of the 3D array. 1D bit-
string was generated by sequentially visiting the cells in the 
3D array by setting the cells in the 3D array.  If there is more 
than one minutia in the cell, set ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’. 
Random permutation was applied on the bit-string using the 
user specific PIN.  
Matching queried template with the enrolled template is 
performed by computing the similarity between them.  Both 
local similarity and global similarity are computed. Local 
similarity is performed by comparing the values of the bit-
strings of the query template with that of the enrolled 
template. Practically, two 1-D bit-strings generated from the 
same reference minutiae are the same. However, it cannot 
know which 1-D bit-strings are generated from the same 
reference point. Therefore, each bit-string of the query 
template is compared with that of the enrolled template. The 
similarity score between the enrolled bit-strings and the 
query bit-strings is computed by finding the number of 
common one between them with a bit-wise AND operator. In 
global similarity, the maximum of local similarity values is 
compared with the (decision) threshold. If the maximum 
local value is greater than or equal to the threshold, this local 
similarity value is picked for global similarity. Otherwise the 
value of the global similarity is set as '0'. The final similarity 
value is obtained. The sum of global similarity values is 
divided by the number of non-zero values of the global 
similarity. Finally, whether to accept or reject is decided by 
comparing the final similarity with the (decision) threshold. 
 
3.4 Modified Minutiae-based Bit-strings CB 
 
The process of the modified minutiae-based bit-strings 
CB fingerprint template generation is shown in Fig. 3. The 
idea is first introduced in [16]. The main idea is to use the 
similar process to generate the bit-string of the minutiae 
except the calculation of the reference point which is influent 
by [29]. Under the modified minutiae-based bit-strings CB, 
the minutiae are firstly extracted from the input fingerprint 
image. The template generation is performed by measuring 
the average distance of all the minutiae from the reference 
minutia and calculating the geometric information of the 
minutiae. One of the minutiae is selected as the reference 
minutia. For each of the reference minutia, the Euclidean 
distance is calculated with the other minutiae. Among these 
distances, the distance of the farthest minutia is selected. A 
line segment is drawn in the direction of the orientation of the 
reference minutia. The length of the line is the average 
distance. The horizontal direction is set as the reference 
direction. The slope of the line and its perpendicular is 
calculated. The transformed fingerprint templates are 
generated by checking the minutiae under the line or above 
the line. The generated template is permuted with the user pin 
which is the transformation key and used as the seed value to 
generate the cancellable fingerprint templates. The matching 
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process is done exactly as same as the minutiae-based bit-
strings CB method. 
 
 
Figure 3 Modified minutiae-based bit-strings CB 
 
3.5 Experimental Settings 
 
The experiments are performed on Window 10, Intel (R) 
Core (TM) i7-8700U, 3.20 GHz processor and 8.00 GB RAM 
machine and implemented by using Matlab 2016a. The 
minutiae of every fingerprint are extracted and formatted 
according to the ISO standard by using the VeriFinger SDK 
10.0 (trail version) of Neurotechnology [30]. The 
performance of the proposed method is evaluated by using 
the public fingerprint data set FVC2002DB1_B and 
FVC2002DB2_B [25] and their six modified data sets as 
described in the modified FVC database section. Tab. 3 
shows the information of each data set used in this work.  
For each fingerprint data set, three experiments are 
conducted. The first experiment aims to measure the 
accuracy of the same finger by matching the fingerprint 
impression and its modified images. The second experiment 
aims to measure the accuracy of the fingerprint impression 
against itself, its different fingerprint impressions and the 
modified image of each fingerprint impressions. Thus, there 
are 640 comparisons for each data set. The third experiment 
aims to measure the accuracy of the fingerprint impression 
against only its different fingerprint impressions. Thus, there 
are 560 comparisons for each data set.  
 
Table 3 Information of Each Data Set  
FVC2002 Sensor Type  Image Size  Resolution 
DB1_B Optical Sensor 388×374  500 dpi 
DB2_B Optical Sensor 296×560  569 dpi 
 
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Tab. 4 presents the accuracy performance of both 
methods on matching the same fingerprint image with its 
modified fingerprint image. Minutiae-based bit-strings CB is 
denoted CB1 while the modified minutiae-based bit-strings 
CB is denoted CB2. According to the results, the modified 
minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB2) performs well on the 
FVC2002DB2_B data set. For the FVC2002DB1_B, 
minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB1) performs poorly on the 
rotated images of 10 degrees both clockwise and 
anticlockwise direction.  
 
Table 4 Accuracy of each method when comparing the same fingerprint image with 
its modified images  
Image FVC2002DB1_B FVC2002DB2_B CB1 CB2 CB1 CB2 
B (-70) 100% 98.75% 100% 100% 
B (+35) 98.75% 98.75% 100% 100% 
CW5 100% 100% 87.50% 100% 
CW10 86.25% 96.25% 71.25% 100% 
CCW5 93.75% 98.75% 86.25% 100% 
CCW10 87.50% 96.25% 73.75% 100% 
 
Tab. 5 presents the accuracy performance of both 
methods on matching the fingerprint impression against 
itself, its different fingerprint impressions and the modified 
image of each fingerprint impressions. According to the 
results presented in Tab. 5, the modified minutiae-based bit-
strings CB (CB2) outperforms the minutiae-based bit-strings 
CB (CB1) in all cases for both data sets. The modified 
minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB2) also provides a higher 
accuracy on FVC2002DB2_B than that of FVC2002DB1_B. 
Interesting finding is that the modified minutiae-based bit-
strings CB (CB2) seems to have an issue with a fingerprint 
impression of a dry finger B (+35) for both data sets.  
 
Table 5 Accuracy of each method when comparing the fingerprint image with 
modified images of all impressions  
Image FVC2002DB1_B FVC2002DB2_B CB1 CB2 CB1 CB2 
Origin 41.41% 96.56% 35% 100% 
B (−70) 38.13% 96.41% 35.94% 100% 
B (+35) 37.97% 95.63% 34.69% 99.84% 
CW5 41.41% 96.56% 25.63% 100% 
CW10 35.16% 96.41% 22.81% 100% 
CCW5 35% 96.41% 25.31% 100% 
CCW10 33.44% 95.31% 22.81% 100% 
 
Tab. 6 presents the accuracy performance of both 
methods on matching the fingerprint image with different 
impressions of the same finger and the modified different 
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impressions of the same finger. As expected, the modified 
minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB2) outperforms the 
minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB1) in all cases for both data 
sets. The modified minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB2) also 
provides a higher accuracy on FVC2002DB2_B than that of 
FVC2002DB1_B.  
 
Table 6 Accuracy of each method when comparing the same fingerprint image with 
different impression of the same finger and its modified images  
Image FVC2002DB1_B FVC2002DB2_B 
CB1 CB2 CB1 CB2 
Origin 28.91% 84.06% 25.71% 100% 
B (−70) 25.63% 84.06% 26.79% 100% 
B (+35) 28.91% 84.06% 25.36% 99.82% 
CW5 24.38% 84.06% 16.79% 100% 
CW10 24.38% 83.91% 15.89% 100% 
CCW5 23.28% 84.06% 16.61% 100% 
CCW10 22.50% 83.28% 15.54% 100% 
 
From all experimental results, minutiae-based bit-strings 
CB (CB1) performs poorly on both data sets in comparison 
with that of the modified minutiae-based bit-strings CB 
(CB2). The fingerprint template generation in CB1 was 
dependent not only on the size of the image but also on the 
number of minutiae. The minutiae information in the 
modified images are different from that of the original 
images.  
The modified minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB2) is 
more robust when the image quality and the rotation is 
changed. This causes by the information collected by the 
CB2 in the minutiae because CB2 collects the distance and 
the geometric information of the minutia. Even the direction 
of the minutiae is changed, the Euclidean distance between 
the two minutiae remains the same. Moreover, the fingerprint 
images in FVC2002DB2_B are high resolution images. 
Therefore, the modified minutiae-based bit-strings CB (CB2) 
obtains a better matching accuracy on FVC2002DB2_B than 
that of FVC2002DB1_B.  
Another interesting finding is that the minutiae-based 
bit-strings CB (CB1) results in a better performance on the 
modified images when the fingerprint image brightness is 
decreasing (i.e., B (−70)). This event is caused by the fact 
that most of the non-matched images of the origin images are 
collected in lighted or partial images. Fig. 4 shows the sample 
modified images in FVC2002DB2_B.   
 
 
Figure 4 Sample B (−70) modified images in FVC2002DB2_B  
 
According to the sample modified images, when the 
fingerprint image brightness is decreasing some minutiae 
points appear. Thus, more minutiae points can be extracted 
than that of the original images. The increasing number of 




In the traditional fingerprint-based authentication system 
without any template protection, an unknown original 
fingerprint image can be reconstructed from the stored 
minutiae template. Obtaining minutia templates is the loss of 
biometrics forever. If a few templates in the database are 
compromised, a re-enrolment of all the users may be 
necessary and will cost lot of time and money.  Therefore, a 
protected fingerprint template has been used instead.  
In the real situation, the quality of the fingerprint images 
may not be as expected for example during an emergency 
situation. Different qualities of fingerprints are created 
according to environmental conditions during an emergency, 
such as wet or dry fingers and a disoriented angle of 
fingerprint images. These fingerprint images are used for 
evaluating two cancellable fingerprint template approaches. 
The two cancellable fingerprint template approaches have 
been selected because their techniques include the geometric 
information of the fingerprint into the minutiae. As a result, 
the two approaches have a high potential to be robust to the 
disoriented angle of the fingerprint images.  
The experimental results have shown that the modified 
minutiae-based bit-strings CB performs well on all 
conditions during an emergency situation by achieving the 
matching accuracy between 83% and 100% on 
FVC2002DB1_B data set and between 99% and 100% on 
FVC2002DB2_B data set. The result of this work will be 
further used for proposing an improved fingerprint feature 
transformation approach for personal health record users 
during emergency situation as introduced in [31] under the 




This work was supported by the Higher Education 
Research Promotion and the Thailand’s Education Hub for 
Southern Region of ASEAN Countries Project Office of the 





The article was orally presented at the 23rd International 
Computer Science and Engineering Conference 
(ICSEC2019). 
 
6 REFERENCES  
 
[1] Maltoni, D., Maio, D., Jain, A. K., & Prabhakar, S. (2009). 
Handbook of fingerprint recognition (2nd ed.). Springer-
Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-254-2 
[2] Jain, A. K., Nandakumar, K., & Ross, A. (2016). 50 years of 
biometric research: accomplishments, challenges, and 
opportunities. Pattern Recognition Letters, 79, 80-105. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2015.12.013 
[3] Ratha, N. K., Chikkerur, S., Connell, J. H., & Bolle, R. M. 
(2007). Generating cancelable fingerprint templates. IEEE 
Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 
29(4), 561-572. https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2007.1004 
Ei Ei MON et al.: EVALUATING BIOMETRICS FINGERPRINT TEMPLATE PROTECTION FOR AN EMERGENCY SITUATION 
TEHNIČKI GLASNIK 13, 4(2019), 280-285                                     285 
[4] Cao, K., & Jain, A. K. (2014). Learning fingerprint 
reconstruction: from minutiae to image. IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, 10(1), 104-117. 
https://doi.org/ 10.1109/TIFS.2014.2363951 
[5] Jin, Z., Hwang, J. Y., Lai, Y. L., Kim, S., & Teoh, A. B. J. 
(2018). Ranking-based locality sensitive hashing-enabled 
cancelable biometrics: index-of-max hashing. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 13(2), 
393-407. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2017.2753172 
[6] Wang, S., Deng, G., & Hu, J. (2017). A partial Hadamard 
transform approach to the design of cancelable fingerprint 
templates containing binary biometric representations. Pattern 
Recognition, 61, 447-458.  
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patcog.2016.08.017  
[7] Wang, S., Yang, W., & J. Hu. (2017). Design of alignment-free 
cancelable fingerprint templates with zoned minutia pairs. 
Pattern Recognition, 66, 295-301. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j. patcog.2017.01.019 
[8] Ferrara, M., Maltoni, D., & Cappelli, R. (2012). Noninvertible 
minutia cylinder-code representation. IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, 7(6), 727-1737.  
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2012.2215326 
[9] Cappelli, R., Ferrara, M., & Maltoni, D. (2010). Minutia 
cylinder-code: a new representation and matching technique 
for fingerprint recognition. IEEE Transactions on Pattern 
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 32(12), 2128-2141.  
https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2010.52 
[10] Ferrara, M., Maltoni, D., & Cappelli, R. (2014). A two-factor 
protection scheme for MCC fingerprint templates. In 2014 
International Conference of the Biometrics Special Interest 
Group (BIOSIG), pp. 1-8. IEEE. 
[11] Wang, S. & Hu, J. (2016). A blind system identification 
approach to cancelable fingerprint templates. Pattern 
Recognition, 54, 14-22.  
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patcog.2016. 01.001  
[12]  Prasad, M. V., Anugu, J. R., & Rao, C. R. (2016). Fingerprint 
template protection using multiple spiral curves. In 
Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Advanced 
Computing, Networking and Informatics, Springer, New Delhi, 
593-601. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2538-6_61 
[13] Lee, C. & Kim, J. (2010). Cancelable fingerprint templates 
using minutiae-based bit-strings. Journal of Network and 
Computer Applications, 33(3), 236-246.  
 https://doi.org/10.1016/ j. jnca.2009.12.011 
[14] Guo, L., Mao, Y., & Guo, Y. (2016). Non-invertible fingerprint 
template protection with polar transformations. In 2016 14th 
Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), 730-
735, IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/PST.2016.7906990 
[15] Das, P., Karthik, K., & Garai, B. C. (2012). A robust alignment-
free fingerprint hashing algorithm based on minimum distance 
graphs. Pattern Recognition, 45(9), 3373-3388.  
 https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.patcog.2012.02.022 
[16] Kumar, N. (2012). Cancelable fingerprint template. 
Department of Mathematics, Indian Academy of Sciences. 
[17] Wong, W. J., Wong, M. L. D., & Kho, Y. H. (2013). Multi-line 
code: A low complexity revocable fingerprint template for 
cancelable biometrics. Journal of Central South University, 
20(5), 1292-1297.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11771-013-1614-8 
[18] Belguechi, R., Hafiane, A., Cherrier, E., & Rosenberger, C. 
(2016). Comparative study on texture features for fingerprint 
recognition: application to the biohashing template protection 
scheme. Journal of Electronic Imaging, 25(1), 013033.  
https://doi.org/10.1117/1.JEI.25.1.013033 
[19] Moujahdi, C., Bebis, G., Ghouzali, S., & Rziza, M. (2014). 
Fingerprint shell: Secure representation of fingerprint template. 
Pattern Recognition Letters, 45, 189-196.  
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2014.04.001 
[20] Nazmul, R., Islam, M. R., & Chowdhury, A. R. (2017). 
Alignment-Free Fingerprint Template Protection Technique 
Based on Minutiae Neighbourhood Information. In 
International Conference on Applications and Techniques in 
Cyber Security and Intelligence, 256-265, Edizioni della 
Normale, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67071-3_32 
[21] Sandhya, M. & Prasad, M. V. (2015). k-Nearest Neighborhood 
Structure (k-NNS) based alignment-free method for fingerprint 
template protection. In 2015 International Conference on 
Biometrics (ICB), 386-393, IEEE.  
 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICB. 2015.7139100 
[22] Li, G., Yang, B., Rathgeb, C., & Busch, C. (2015). Towards 
generating protected fingerprint templates based on bloom 
filters. In 3rd International workshop on biometrics and 
forensics (IWBF 2015), 1-6, IEEE.  
 https://doi.org/10.1109/IWBF.2015.7110224 
[23] Kanagalakshmi, K. & Chandra, E. (2013). A Novel Technique 
for Cancelable and Irrevocable Biometric Template Generation 
for Fingerprints. Global Journal of Computer Science and 
Technology,13(6). Retrieved from https://computerresearch. 
org/index.php/computer/article/view/208/208 
[24] See http://bias.csr. unibo.it/fvc2000/databases.asp. 
[25] See http://bias.csr. unibo.it/fvc2002/databases.asp. 
[26] See http://bias.csr. unibo.it/fvc2004/databases.asp. 
[27] See http://bias.csr. unibo.it/fvc2006/databases.asp. 
[28] Choosang, P. (2016). Secure fingerprint identification 
evaluation for unconscious personal health records users: a 
case study in an emergency situation, Master’s thesis, Prince of 
Songkla University, Thailand. 
[29] Ang, R., Safavi-Naini, R., & McAven, L. (2005). Cancelable 
key-based fingerprint templates. In Australasian Conference 
on Information Security and Privacy, Springer, Berlin, 
Heidelberg, 242-252. https://doi.org/10.1007/11506157_21 
[30] See http://neurotechnology.com. 
[31] Choosang, P. & Vasupongayya, S. (2015). Using fingerprints 
to identify personal health record users in an emergency 
situation. In 2015 International Computer Science and 
Engineering Conference (ICSEC), 1-6, IEEE.  
 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSEC.2015.7401421 
[32] Thummavet, P. & Vasupongayya, S. (2015). Privacy-
preserving emergency access control for personal health 
records. Maejo International Journal of Science and 






Ei Ei MON, M.C.Sc* 
5910130005@psu.ac.th 
 
Sangsuree VASUPONGAYYA, PhD, Assist. Prof. 
vsangsur@coe.psu.ac.th 
 
Montri KARNJANADECHA, PhD, Assoc. Prof. 
montri@coe.psu.ac.th 
 
Touchai ANGCHUAN, MSc, Assist. Prof. 
touch@coe.psu.ac.th 
 
Department of Computer Engineering, 
Faculty of Engineering, Prince of Songkla University, 
Hat Yai, Songkhla 90112, Thailand 
